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Anyone taken as an individual is tolerably sensible and reasonable—as a member of a 
crowd, he at once becomes a blockhead. 
—Friedrich von Schiller, as quoted by Bernard Baruch 
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As Charles Kindleberger so astutely points out, there is a deep-seated proclivity in human 
behavior to make invidious comparisons between one’s neighbors’ wealth and one’s own. 
It does seem very difficult to sit around and do nothing while those around us are getting 
rich. This behavioral tendency seems easily observable in what we might identify as 
speculative bubbles, whether it be the Tulip Mania of the 1630s, the South Sea Bubble of 
the 18th century,1 or the tech stocks of the late 1990s. Perhaps the most readily observable 
instance of this tendency was in the subprime bubble of the last decade, in which 
“everyone and their mother” was speculating on houses.  
  
There is an old fable, the origins of which I am not entirely sure, that quite wonderfully 
illustrates this behavioral tendency. I’ll do my best to recount the story here: 
 
There once was a genie who granted a man three wishes on one condition—whatever the 
man wished for, his neighbor would receive twice the amount. First, the man wished for a 
great estate. The wish was granted. The man had a great estate with everything he needed 
to satisfy all his needs and desires—except for one: his desire to have more than his 
neighbor. Observing the new estate of his neighbor, which was now twice the size of his, 
the man covetously called in his second wish: an unparalleled stock of cattle. So his wish 
was granted, and indeed he had more cattle than everyone else in the land, except for his 
neighbor who now had cattle equivalent to unparalleled x2. Upset with his relative lack 
of wealth, the man thought, calculated, and thought some more. Then he called upon the 
genie to grant him his final wish.  
 
This is what the man said: “Genie, undoubtedly, you have made my first two wishes 
come true and they are indeed great. But my neighbor has been granted twice what I have 
received, and I just can’t stand it anymore! For my third and final wish I want you to 
make me blind in one eye!” 
 
We have a subconscious proclivity for comparing our wealth with those around us, and 
this proclivity is always coupled with an insatiable desire to have relatively more. This 
behavioral phenomenon is of interest generally as it offers insights into the desires that 
motivate all of us; however, it is also of interest specifically to this paper, as it provides a 
psychological insight into how and why investors engage in speculative trading even 
when asset prices have skyrocketed beyond any sort of fundamental valuation. When 
securities markets are surging upward, it is easy to get rich and it is difficult to watch 
others do so without jumping on the bandwagon.  
 
Rather than assuming an unrealistic, reductionist view of humans as utility maximizing 
hedonists, why not assume a rich and complex array of motivations, sometimes 
contradictory, deeply embedded in our psychological propensities, that recognizes the 
intricacy (and dare I say beauty) of human behavior?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Even the master of the mint, Sir Isaac Newton himself, lost a fortune speculating on shares of the South 
Sea Company. Newton perceptively acknowledged the difficulties faced by the social scientist—namely, 
the irrationality of human beings: “I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies but not the madness of 
people.” 
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I. Abstract 
 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), speculative bubbles do not exist 
and are impossible. We disagree. If prices are the only observable component of an 
asset’s value,2 and they themselves are an aggregated consensus of perceived value, then 
what about the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is testable? Rather than assume that 
prices always reflect value (i.e. perfect market efficiency), we maintain that markets are 
efficient to the extent that one can be confident that tomorrow’s prices will not diverge 
dramatically or arbitrarily from today’s prices, absent significant new information.3 
Speculative bubbles are not materializing every day, every month, or even every year.4 
But they do have the potential and indeed a tendency to occur from time to time.  
 
If markets are efficient, what explains all the trading? Rather than assume rational 
expectations and a homogenous investor class, we assume four investor classes that 
diverge in their perception of value (i.e. in their expectation of future returns) and thus 
trade with each other. Using insights from Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (FIH), we develop a theoretical framework for how a speculative bubble 
might materialize within a modern capitalist economy with securities markets’ that 
follow a random walk.5 
 
Obviously, there is no “bubble” variable. We use Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the price of an 
asset to its replacement cost, and Shiller’s cyclically adjusted P/E ratio as proxy variables 
for bubbles. We find statistically significant, negative relationships between both of these 
proxy variables and our dependent variable, Ten Year Cumulative Returns, thereby 
providing evidence against the EMH and suggesting the possibility of speculative 
bubbles.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) yields a paradox: if securities markets are 
efficient then profitable trading strategies do not exist and rational investors would hold 
an index fund that reflects the performance of the market overall, adjusting their weights 
in stocks and bonds in response to price shocks only to rebalance their respective Sharpe 
ratios, rather than engaging in speculative trades. If trading is rendered unprofitable then 
what is the mechanism by which prices adjust to “fully reflect” new information? It is 
only through buy and sell offers that prices adjust to equal value. The EMH cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 That is, value itself is not observed. Prices thus serve as the market’s best approximation of value; I think 
they can be thought of as our best proxy for the underlying value of an asset.  
3 Of course, markets must be relatively efficient. Perfect inefficiency implies that prices are perfectly 
arbitrary. This would make it very difficult for any economy to function. We take this to be intuitively and 
empirically consistent (and self-evident) I think most of us our pretty sure that we can afford to buy eggs, 
milk, bread, and the like at reasonable prices in the foreseeable future. 	  	  
4 In fact, in the U.S. we have only experienced two episodes that can truly be identified as bubbles: The 
Stock market frenzy of the 1920s that led to the Great Depression, and the subprime mortgage crisis of the 
mid 2000s that led to the 2nd Great Contraction. The so-called DotCom bubble is also a good candidate, 
though it did not  
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explain why trading occurs (let alone why it would occur at the volume at which it does) 
because it assumes that people develop rational expectations about value. In order to 
explain why trading occurs we assume that investors can also develop irrational 
expectations. To model this, we assume four investor classes6: (1) Rational Investors 
(RI), (2) Over Reactors (OR), (3) Slow Learners (SL), and (4) Crowd Investors (CI).  
 
Because we assume that investors can (and do) develop irrational expectations, we 
imagine market price fluctuations as a consequence of a seesaw or pendulum-like 
mechanism, by which prices “orbit” around value, such that 𝑃! ≈ 𝑉!, most of the time. In 
the absence of a bubble, ORs will buy from SLs in response to a positive price shock, and 
SLs will buy from ORs in response to a negative price shock. Because SLs and ORs are 
trading more than RIs, they are incurring transaction costs and RIs show superior 
performance to other investor types most of the time. Therefore the CIs gravitate towards 
the RIs most of the time and price very closely approximates value. In this situation, 
markets are efficient as the majority of investors follow the RI class. This is the 
theoretical foundation for market efficiency, which explains how efficiency happens 
rather than erroneously assuming that prices adjust to new information automatically.  
 
This reasoning also provides a theoretical foundation for how speculative bubbles might 
manifest. Assume a series of positive random shocks. Initially, there will not be much of 
a divergence in price from value. But, as these positive shocks continue, just by chance, 
investors start to believe that there is something new about the market (whatever this 
“new paradigm” is, the fundamental implication is that estimates of future returns 
become biased upward and/or risk measurements become biased downwards). Now, ORs 
become heavily weighted in stocks and are also trading on margin (i.e. are highly 
leveraged) because of their higher risk tolerance. If these positive shocks continue for 
some time, these levered ORs are making a lot of money; indeed, they will be showing 
superior performance to the other investor classes.7 As this happens, the CIs move their 
money to the ORs (or equivalently, emulate the ORs), further bidding up asset prices. At 
some point all this good news has become the new reality and even RIs and SLs get 
caught up in the frenzy, lest they be left in the dust by their “neighbors.”  
 
The better the news, the bigger the bubble; however, the bigger the bubble, the greater the 
chance that the next news story will not be as good as expected! As reality hits, as it 
always does, the bubble deflates. Thus, speculative bubbles sow the seeds of their own 
destruction. 
 
The theory is guided by Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, which helps 
explain how a series of random positive shocks can snowball into a speculative bubble. 
Ultimately, we believe that securities markets are efficient to the extent that one can be 
confident that today’s price will not diverge dramatically from tomorrow’s price.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  As opposed to the one, paradoxical one implied by EMH.  
7 Since any positive shock over more than one instant is a sum of largely positive shocks over shorter 
periods, (i.e. a positive shock over the course of one day is the sum of the hourly shocks, which is a sum of 
shocks per minute, etc.) the ORs will on balance be accumulating stock as its price rises and thus having 
superior returns.  
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In this paper, we critically examine the assumptions of the EMH and present some 
arguments for altered assumptions. Once these assumptions are relaxed, it becomes easier 
to see why markets might not always be efficient and how bubbles might materialize.  
 
II. Background 
Prices imply buyers, sellers, and a market. More importantly, prices imply an agreement 
between two parties with respect to the underlying value of the entity being exchanged. 
The development of simple financial instruments such as equity and debt that can be 
traded implies the existence of a financial market and what seems to be an implicit 
agreement between buyers and sellers with respect to the value of said securities.  
Over the last fifty years, economics and finance departments around the world have 
witnessed the development and ascendance of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), 
which simply states that securities’ prices at any point in time fully reflect all publicly 
available information at that time. Equivalently, 𝑃! = 𝑉!.  Price changes are random as 
they are a function only of new information, which is random. The fundamental 
implication of the EMH, is that there are no long-term trading strategies that can 
outperform the market. 
One of the enduring ironies of the EMH, is that market efficiency itself is dependent upon 
practitioners’ belief that markets are inefficient. Why? Because it is through the trading 
mechanism that prices are pushed to value and are adjusted to reflect new information. 
Trading occurs presumably because investors believe they can capture excess risk-
adjusted returns. If there are indeed no long-term profitable trading strategies, what 
explains the persistent and increasing volume of trading? Furthermore, the EMH is built 
on the assumption that investors develop rational expectations about both the present and 
future value of securities. If people do in fact develop rational expectations, they would 
not engage in trading, but just hold an index fund that reflects the overall performance of 
the stock market. Both of these conditions cannot hold simultaneously.    
Reality demonstrates that a tremendous amount of trading occurs everyday.  In 2008, for 
example, annual turnover on the NYSE exceeded 135%, implying that each share of each 
stock was traded 1.35 times on average! This intensity of trading has been increasing 
substantially since the 1970s.8 Though the volume of trading has fallen somewhat in the 
wake of the 2nd Great Contraction, it is still significantly higher than its historical 
average.  
Another apparent difficulty with the EMH, is that it can only be tested against another 
equilibrium model of asset pricing. Why? Because only prices are observable, value is 
not. Thus, tests of efficiency will only be valid if we have an asset-pricing model that is 
accurate. This is the famous joint hypothesis problem. All asset-pricing models depend 
on an accurate assessment of risk to determine value. The more we learn about financial 
markets, the more it seems that we are unable to accurately determine the inherent risk of 
various financial securities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jonathan Berk and Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance, 2nd Ed.  
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In other words, according to the EMH, securities of equivalent risk should have the same 
expected return. However, “equivalent risk” is not defined, rendering the EMH 
impossible to test. A measure of risk is defined under the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) assumptions, and thus we can test the idea that no profitable trading strategies 
exist in the CAPM by testing whether the market portfolio is efficient and all trading 
strategies have a zero “alpha” (i.e. trading strategies are on or below the Security Market 
line).  
Empirical tests of the EMH, therefore, typically rely on the CAPM’s measure of risk. 
Ironically, the empirical evidence is not conclusive—while individual investors and 
professional fund managers on average perform no better than the market, there are 
profitable trading strategies that exist. This inconclusiveness is a consequence of the joint 
hypothesis problem: perhaps the CAPM is not accurately measuring risk.9 This is no easy 
task, and there is perhaps no quest more important in finance than correctly measuring 
risk.  
There is a growing literature today that is concerned with the impact of rare, “fat-tail” 
events and our inability to calculate the probability of their occurrence. The 
epistemologist, statistician, and trader, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, has developed some of 
these ideas into what is now loosely referred to as Black Swan Theory:  
 What we call here a Black Swan (and capitalize it) is an event with the 
following three attributes. First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm 
of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point 
to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme ‘impact.’ Third, in spite of 
its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its 
occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.10   
Ironically, this third characteristic of hindsight rationalization has been used by Eugene 
Fama as a criticism of those who believe asset bubbles exist (see below), but this 
criticism could be levied with equal if not greater validity against those who 
retrospectively “correct” their equilibrium model of asset pricing to confirm the EMH 
when confronted with negative results.  
If Taleb, et. al are correct about the difficulty in accurately assessing risk, then how can 
we be sure that our tests of the EMH are accurate? Might it not be the case that our 
equilibrium asset-pricing models are wanting? The issue is apparently (very) unresolved.  
This year the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded jointly to Fama and Robert 
Shiller,11 "for their empirical analysis of asset prices”12. Fama is largely responsible for 
the theoretical development of the EMH beginning in the 1960s with his PhD dissertation 
at the University of Chicago where he has remained since. Shiller is the Sterling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 To the extent that CAPM does not include securities from global markets, it is clearly mispricing risk.  
10 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House, New 
York, NY. 2007. p. xvii-xviii.  
11 Lars Hansen also shared the prize.  
12 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/press.html 
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Professor of Economics at Yale and is well known for his book Irrational Exuberance as 
well as his meticulous collection of historical real estate and stock price data.13   
Amusingly, the two economists’ analyses bring them to diametrically opposed 
conclusions about how assets are priced and how prices change. Fama outright denies the 
existence of speculative “bubbles” on the grounds that there are no econometric tests that 
allow us to predict when a bubble is forming or when it might burst. According to Fama, 
all bubbles are only recognized as such retrospectively. Furthermore, he criticizes the use 
of the term as being inconsistent and misleading. 
Shiller, on the other hand, consistently refers to the EMH as a “half-truth,” and that 
financial markets are repeatedly subject to fads or social epidemics that cause prices to 
fluctuate around value. Shiller believes that economics must rely on and integrate 
theories from other disciplines within the social sciences to develop a more accurate 
model of human behavior (i.e. a model of human behavior that has more explanatory 
power than the rational expectations model). Shiller asserts that speculative bubbles do 
indeed occur and are the result of feedback mechanisms between investors and the media 
that cause asset prices to be bid up beyond fundamental value.  
Financial markets since the late 1980s have witnessed some extreme turbulence 
(relatively speaking)—from the Market Crash of 1987, to the rise and fall of Japanese 
stocks and real estate in the 1990s, to the NASDAQ boom and bust in the early 2000s, to 
the subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. at the end of the last decade that has led to our 
current global recession—that seem inconsistent with the EMH. Much of the revolution 
in behavioral economics and behavioral finance over the last twenty years are indicative 
of this apparent incongruity. 
Despite all this, Fama and his followers maintain that markets are efficient. We think 
there are bubbles.  
a. The Role of Financial Markets: Connecting Lenders & Borrowers  
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange was established in 1602 to finance the trading ventures 
of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC, "United 
East India Company").14 After successfully raising money by selling shares in what can 
only be described as the world’s first IPO, it was not long before a securities market 
emerged where investors and speculators could trade shares and speculate on short-term 
share prices. Thus it was in 17th century Amsterdam that “the global securities market 
began to take on its modern form.”15 
Since the beginning of the 17th century, financial markets have become both increasingly 
complex and important to the development of what might be described as a “modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Shiller was instrumentally in developing the Case-Shiller Index for U.S. Housing Prices as well as the 
Shiller P/E ratio. 	  
14 Initial expeiditions were financed to capture profits from the Malukan spice trade. And capture profits 
they certainly did! The VOC provided approximately 18% annual returns, on average for nearly 200 years!  
15 Ranald C. Michie, The Global Securities Market: A History (Oxford 2006) 26.	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economy.” In fact, there are few who would argue that a modern economy is possible 
without the development of sophisticated financial markets.   
By financial markets we mean those institutional arrangements that facilitate the 
allocation of an economy’s capital stock by connecting lenders with borrowers through 
the issuance of stocks (equity) and bonds (debt). In a very real sense, financial markets 
facilitate the manifestation of innovative ideas by connecting those keen on investing 
their savings with those who have ideas but lack the capital necessary to implement them. 
Financial markets unleash this creative potentiality through this capacity of 
intermediation. It is difficult to imagine how an idea or venture could come to fruition 
without this crucial function.    
Within securities markets, a distinction between primary markets and secondary markets 
must be made. 
a.1 Primary Markets 
Primary markets are markets through which firms raise new money from the public 
through the issuance of stocks or bonds (or instruments which combine features of both). 
It is through these primary markets that good ideas are launched by the issuance of 
securities intended to finance future growth.  
a.2 Secondary Markets  
Once securities are issued they are negotiable—they can be bought or sold or given away. 
This trading of securities is done primarily through securities exchanges. Secondary 
markets play two important functions: (1) they add liquidity to the market thereby freeing 
up capital for new, profitable ideas and (2) they facilitate economic efficiency by 
providing a means by which prices can adjust to reflect the supply and demand for 
different securities (price discovery). However, this trading of securities has become so 
pervasive, especially with the rise of the internet and the consequent decline in trading 
costs, that it is unclear whether their social benefits outweigh their social costs. The line 
between trading and gambling is a fine one indeed, if it exists at all.  
John Maynard Keynes expressed this concern nearly ninety years ago:    
When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the 
activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of 
success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the 
proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable 
channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the 
outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism—which is not surprising, 
if I am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street have been in 
fact directed towards a different object.  
These tendencies are a scarcely avoidable outcome of our having 
successfully organized “liquid” investment markets. It is usually agreed 
that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. 
And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges. 
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Keynes wrote The General Theory in the wake of the Great Depression. As we slowly 
emerge from the 2nd Great Contraction (so-called by Reinhart and Rogoff), perhaps it is 
wise to consider Keynes’ words regarding the imposition of greater transactions costs on 
speculative trading.   
a.3 The Importance of Financial Markets: Prices as Signals  
The prices set in financial markets are extremely important not only to those actively 
engaged in trading, but to the rest of the economy as well. In fact, they are arguably more 
important for the latter as the aggregated consequences to the entire population seem 
greater than the gains or losses of speculative traders. Regardless, financial markets price 
everything from financial securities to commodities, which include everything from the 
price of real estate to coffee.  
Prices are like signals or signposts that allow individuals to make informed decisions 
about how to allocate their resources. We use prices to determine how much money we 
can generate through the expenditure of our labor over a given period of time, how much 
to save in preparation for the future, whether or not to invest in a particular asset, etc. 
Thus, if prices were arbitrary or subject to capricious fluctuation, much of the economy 
would be unable to accurately form expectations about the future and consequently 
unable to make decisions in the present. Because this is apparently not the case, we tend 
to think that prices reflect some underlying quality of the asset, namely value. Ironically, 
we can never observe the actual value of an asset. As mentioned, the only thing we 
observe is price.  
But financial markets appear to be subject to asset bubbles, in which traders and lenders 
get carried away in waves of euphoria in which they overestimate returns and 
underestimate risk. During these euphoric waves, traders take on excessive amounts of 
debt and bid asset prices to unsustainable levels. Then at some point reality hits and asset 
prices begin to fall. Loans are called in or not renewed, and the traders are forced to sell 
at any price. Asset prices collapse and lenders either fail or are bailed out by 
governments. Credit dries up and a recession ensues. It has happened over and over and 
no doubt will happen again. 
a.4 Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH)   
In economies where borrowing and lending exist, ingenuity goes into 
developing and introducing financial innovations, just as into production 
and marketing innovations. Financing is often based upon an assumption 
“that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely” (GT, p. 152), 
but of course this assumption proves false. During a boom the existing 
state is the boom with its accompanying capital gains and asset 
revaluations. During both a debt-deflation and a stagnant recession the 
same conventional assumption of the present always ruling is made; the 
guiding wisdom is that debts are to be avoided, for debts lead to disaster. 
As a recovery approaches full employment the current generation of 
economic soothsayers will proclaim that the business cycle has been 
banished from the land and a new era of permanent prosperity has been 
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inaugurated. Debts can be taken on because the new policy instruments—
be it the Federal Reserve System or fiscal policy—together with the 
greater sophistication of the economic scientists advising on policy assure 
that crises and debt-deflations are now things of the past. But in truth 
neither the boom, nor the debt deflation, nor the stagnation, and certainly 
not a recovery or full-employment growth can continue indefinitely. Each 
state nurtures forces that lead to its own destruction.16  
The late economist Hyman P. Minsky17 was acutely aware of the systematic tendency of 
modern capitalist economies to misallocate resources. Disagreeing with many of his 
contemporaries who advocated financial deregulation in response to what many thought 
to be a new macroeconomic paradigm whereby the business cycle could be managed 
scientifically with monetary and fiscal policy, he argued that modern financial markets 
sow the seeds of their own destruction by encouraging speculation and the build up of 
increasingly risky credit structures and thus require significant regulatory oversight. 
Though many dismissed Minsky as a cynic, he certainly seems to have been vindicated in 
the aftermath of the 2nd Great Contraction.  
Today Minsky is perhaps best known for his Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), 
which he summed up best in three words: “Stability is destabilizing.” At first glance, this 
may seem to be a paradoxical or even absurd statement, but further consideration yields 
an interesting logical foundation for the claim. The basic idea is that an economic boom 
can lull investors and other market participants into a false sense of security. As investors 
become over confident in their valuation of the market, they lever up and take on more 
risk. Implicit in Minsky’s thinking is a conception of human memory that puts more 
weight on the most recent past. People make judgments and form expectations about the 
future based on what they have experienced most recently. Evidently, human beings 
don’t have a very robust memory when it comes to financial history, as speculative 
manias have occurred over and over again. Is it a coincidence that the implosion of the 
subprime mortgage market and the ensuing 2nd Great Contraction occurred about seventy 
years after the Great Depression? (this seems like roughly enough time for anyone who 
was old enough to remember the Great Depression firsthand to have passed away).  
As the subjective repercussions of the debt-deflation wear off, as 
disinvestment occurs, and as financial positions are rebuilt during the 
stagnant phase, a recovery and expansion begins. Such a recovery starts 
with strong memories of the penalty extracted because of exposed liability 
positions during the debt-deflation and with liability structures that have 
been purged of debt. However, success breeds daring and over time, the 
memory of the past disaster is eroded. Stability—even of an expansion—is 
destabilizing in that more adventuresome financing of investment pays off 
to the leaders, and others follow. Thus an expansion will, at an 
accelerating rate, feed into the boom.18   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Minsky, Hyman P. John Maynard Keynes. Columbia University Press, New York, NY: 1975. (p. 128).	  
17 I have had the unique pleasure of studying under Hyman Minsky’s student, Dr. Harold Petersen!  
18 Minsky, Hyman P. John Maynard Keynes. Columbia University Press, New York, NY: 1975. (p. 127).	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Observing the recurring cycle of boom and bust within financial markets, Minsky was 
deeply impressed by what he perceived to be their inherent fragility. While other 
contemporary economists worked to explain away anomalies to market efficiency 
individually, attributing each one to “exogenous shocks”, Minsky suspected that qualities 
of the economy itself were a contributing factor to the development of speculative 
manias.   
Minsky identified five stages of a typical speculative bubble: (1) Displacement, (2) 
Boom, (3) Euphoria, (4) Profit Taking, and (5) Panic.19 
(1) Displacement 
A displacement is any event or series of events that changes the way in which investors 
think financial markets work. In his book (blank), John Kenneth Galbraith aptly describes 
this phase:  
The more obvious features of the speculative episode are manifestly clear 
to anyone open to understanding. Some artifact or some development, 
seemingly new and desirable—tulips in Holland, gold in Louisiana, real 
estate in Florida, the superb economic designs of Ronald Reagan—
captures the financial mind or perhaps, more accurately, what so passes.20  
A key feature of a displacement is that some (seemingly) new financial paradigm 
enamors investors. Other examples include the development of the Internet for 
commercial use or the historically low interest rates ushered in by Alan Greenspan after 
the implosion of the Dotcom bubble and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. These events 
signaled to investors that something new and unprecedented was afoot within financial 
markets. Ironically, there is plenty of precedent for the seeming unprecedented to be 
anything but.  
(2) Boom 
Following a displacement, prices slowly begin to rise as investors are awakened to the 
“new” opportunity. Again, no one wants to be left behind by his or her neighbor who has 
doubled her wealth. These price increases begin to gain momentum as more and more 
participants enter the market. Galbraith also eloquently describes this stage of the bubble: 
The price of the object of speculation goes up. Securities, land, objets 
d’art, and other property, when bought today, are worth more tomorrow. 
This increase and the prospect attract new buyers; the new buyers assure a 
further increase. Yet more are attracted; yet more buy; the increase 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Whether or not Minsky explicitly developed and outlined these five stages is unclear. Charles 
Kindleberger in his book, Manias, Panics, and Crashes, attributes this five-stage framework to Minsky. 
Investopedia also lays out this framework and attributes it to Minsky.  
20 Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Penguin Books, 1994, Kindle Edition. 
(p. 2) 
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continues. The speculation building on itself provides its own 
momentum.21  
The Boom phase is usually characterized by widespread media coverage. Fear of missing 
out on what could potentially be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity draws more traders into 
the speculative fold. Shiller refers to this mechanism of price increases leading to media 
coverage leading to further price increases and so on as a feedback loop: 
A situation in which news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm 
which spreads by psychological contagion from person to person, in the 
process amplifying stories that might justify the price increase and bringing 
in a larger and larger class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real 
value of the investment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others’ 
successes and partly through a gambler’s excitement.22  
Shiller more explicitly lays out the framework for feedback loop theory in his book 
Irrational Exuberance:  
In feedback loop theory, initial price increases…lead to more price 
increases as the effects of the initial price increases feed back into yet 
higher prices through increased investor demand. This second round of 
price increases feeds back again into a third round, and then into a fourth, 
and so on. Thus the initial impact of the precipitating factors is amplified 
into much larger price increases than the factors themselves would have 
suggested.23 
The legendary investor, George Soros, similarly refers to this phenomenon as “reflexivity.”  
[…] markets never reach the equilibrium postulated by economic theory. 
There is a two-way reflexive connection between perception and reality 
which can give rise to initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-
defeating boom-bust processes, or bubbles. Every bubble consists of a 
trend and a misconception that interact in a reflexive manner.24 
(3) Euphoria 
During this phase, restraint is “thrown to the wind” as asset prices skyrocket. Valuations 
reach extreme, unprecedented levels during this phase.25 Furthermore, new valuation 
metrics emerge to rationalize the unremitting rise in prices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Penguin Books, 1994, Kindle Edition. 
(p. 2)	  
22 Shiller, Robert J. “Speculative Asset Prices” (Nobel Prize Lecture), Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 
No. 1936, February 2014 (http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/)  
23	  Shiller, Robert J., Irrational Exuberance Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2005, Second Edition, p. 
68-69	  
24 George Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crash of 2008 and What It Means 
(New York, 2008), p. x.  
25 For example, at the peak of the Japanese real estate bubble in 1989, land in Tokyo sold for as much as 
$139,000 per square foot, or more than 350-times the value of Manhattan property. After the bubble burst, 
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During this phase, any “dissenters” (i.e. those who recognize the speculative orgy and 
call it out as such) are harshly rebuked and censored: “The euphoric episode is protected 
and sustained by the will of those who are involved, in order to justify the circumstances 
that are making them rich. And it is equally protected by the will to ignore, exorcise, or 
condemn those who express doubts.”26 The bearer of bad news is often condemned and 
reproached—this seems to be especially true in speculative bubbles. No one who is 
making easy money wants to be told that their success is unsustainable or unwarranted. 
Perhaps this “rebuke of dissenters” is an indicator of the Euphoria phase of a speculative 
bubble.  
Another potential bubble indicator is the increased use of leverage in speculative wagers:  
During these euphoric periods an increasing number of investors seek 
short-term capital gains from the increases in the prices of real estate and 
stock rather than from the investment income based on the productive use 
of these assets. Individuals make down payments on condo apartments in 
the preconstruction phase of the developments in the anticipation that 
they will be able to sell these apartments at handsome profits when the 
buildings have been completed.27  
The build up of leverage during bull markets is not explained by the EMH.  
(4) Profit Taking 
By this time, seasoned investors are selling out positions and taking hefty profits. But 
predicting the precise time when a bubble is due to implode and when to sell out one’s 
position is a difficult exercise and awfully hazardous to one's financial health, because, as 
John Maynard Keynes put it, " markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay 
solvent." 
(5) Panic 
The final stage of the bubble is its implosion. In the panic stage, asset prices reverse 
course and descend as rapidly as they had risen. Investors and speculators, faced with 
margin calls and plunging values of their holdings, now want to liquidate them at any 
price. This is often referred to as an asset “fire-sale.” As supply overwhelms demand, 
asset prices slide sharply.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
real estate lost approximately 80% of its inflated value, while stock prices declined by 70%. Similarly, at 
the height of the internet bubble in March, 2000, the combined value of all technology stocks on the 
Nasdaq was higher than the GDP of most nations. (investopedia.com)  
26	  Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Penguin Books, 1994, Kindle Edition. 
(p. 11)	  
27 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., Hoboken: 2005, Fifth Edition, p. 11	  
28	  “One of the most vivid examples of global panic in financial markets occurred in October 2008, weeks 
after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG almost collapsed. The 
S&P 500 plunged almost 17% that month, its ninth-worst monthly performance. In that single month, 
global equity markets lost a staggering $9.3 trillion of 22% of their combined market capitalization.” 
(investopedia.com) 
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Galbraith describes two additional characteristics of speculative bubbles that deserve 
mention—the brevity of financial memory and the unfounded association of money with 
intelligence:   
Contributing to and supporting this euphoria are two further factors little 
noted in our time or in past times. The first is the extreme brevity of the 
financial memory. In consequence, financial disaster is quickly forgotten. 
In further consequence, when the same or closely similar circumstances 
occur again, sometimes in only a few years, they are hailed by a new, 
often youthful, and always supremely self-confident generation as a 
brilliantly innovative discovery in the financial and larger economic 
world. There can be few fields of human endeavor in which history counts 
for so little as in the world of finance. Past experience, to the extent that it 
is part of memory at all, is dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who 
do not have the insight to appreciate the incredible wonders of the present.  
The second factor contributing to speculative euphoria and programmed 
collapse is the specious association of money and intelligence. Mention of 
this is not a formula for eliciting reputable applause, but, alas, it must be 
accepted, for acceptance is also highly useful, a major protection against 
personal or institutional disaster.29 
This idea of “financial amnesia” is a fascinating one and it is beyond the scope of 
classical economic theory to address, as it requires an understanding of how memory 
works. The assumption of rational behavior precludes the possibility of a subjective 
memory that places more weight on certain events and experiences while completely 
blotting out others.  
The second factor mentioned by Galbraith is also intriguing as it uncovers a truth about 
human nature in the context of modern market economies. Within capitalist systems, 
money is the measure of achievement, success, and prowess. There is a deep fascination 
with those who are able to procure and command large sums of money. Much of this is 
attributable to the apparent difficulty in making money. Thus, possession of vast 
quantities of money is naturally associated with some special genius:  
This view is then reinforced by the air of self-confidence and self-approval 
that is commonly assumed by the affluent. On no matter is the mental 
inferiority of the ordinary layman so rudely and abruptly stated: ‘I’m 
afraid that you simply don’t understand financial matters.’ In fact, such 
reverence for the possession of money again indicates the shortness of 
memory, the ignorance of history, and the consequent capacity for self- 
and popular delusion just mentioned. Having money may mean, as often 
in the past and frequently in the present, that the person is foolishly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
29	  Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Penguin Books, 1994, Kindle Edition. 
(p. 12-14)	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indifferent to legal constraints and may, in modern times, be a potential 
resident of a minimum-security prison.30 
One need look no further than an undergraduate business program to witness the degree 
to which the brightest young minds are smitten by the allure of Wall Street. Or consider 
Martin Scorsese’s most recent film, The Wolf of Wall Street, which simultaneously 
criticizes and glorifies the debauched lifestyle of the stock trader, Jordan Belfort. 
Whether or not Scorcese wrote the film as a critique or not is irrelevant.  What’s 
important and alarming is the fact that many are enamored by Belfort’s lifestyle and, 
despite recognizing his complete lack of basic decency (let alone any recognizable ethical 
standards), still want to experience it!  
This last September, Shiller wrote an article for Project Syndicate called “The Best, 
Brightest, and Least Productive?”31 in which he seriously considers this problem: “Are 
too many of our most talented people choosing careers in finance—and, more 
specifically, in trading, speculating, and other allegedly ‘unproductive’ activities?” This 
question deserves the utmost consideration, in my opinion.  
b. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
Let’s take a closer look at the EMH. 
As mentioned above, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis states that security prices fully 
reflect all available information. Prices change only in response to new information, 
which cannot be predicted since new information is a random variable. Thus, anything 
predictable is already reflected in the price: “News is good news only if it is better than 
had been expected and is bad news only if worse than had been expected”32   
Equivalently: 𝑃! = 𝑉! = 𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝛥𝑃 = 𝛥𝑉 = 𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑃! = 𝑃!!! + 𝜀!   𝛥𝑃! = 𝜀!  𝐸 𝜀! = 0 
Thus, Price Changes are Random.  
However, without an explanation of what it means to fully reflect this information, the 
equation is reduced to nothing more than a tautology. Hence the famous joint hypothesis 
problem: the EMH necessitates an equilibrium model of how security prices are set by 
which one can make predictions that can be observed and tested.  
The joint hypothesis problem, however, creates an additional problem—that of choosing 
a security pricing model that works (i.e. actually reflects reality). If tests of market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Penguin Books, 1994, Kindle Edition. 
p. 14. 	  
31 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-rent-seeking-problem-in-contemporary-finance-by-
robert-j--shiller 
32 Petersen, Harold. Notes on Capital Markets. Boston College, August 2013. p. 114.  
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efficiency produce negative results, it is difficult to determine whether it is the model that 
is deficient, or markets that are inefficient, or both. This issue still seems to be basically 
unresolved within the literature.   
For the purposes of this paper, let us assume the following valuation model.  Let 
     
€ 
Valt =
Et
kt
 
Where 𝐸! is equal to earnings, defined as the amount that could be paid out to 
shareholders as a constant in perpetuity (in the absence of any future shocks) and 𝑘! is the 
going rate of return on investments of similar risk. This is consistent with any pattern of 
future cash flows, since any pattern of future cash flows can be converted into perpetuity 
of equal value by either borrowing or lending. The discount factor k is the going rate of 
return on investments of similar risk, and it is composed of two parts: a risk-free rate and 
an equity premium: 
€ 
k = rf + e 
The risk free rate depends on both time preference and on the marginal productivity of 
capital.  The equity premium depends on investors’ risk aversion and on the variability of 
future cash flows.   
Assume that we have shocks that impact either 𝐸! or 𝑘! or both in any period of time. 
Thus we have 
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Taking the log of the expression on the right, we have 𝛥 ln 𝑉𝑎𝑙 = 𝛥 ln 𝐸 − 𝛥 ln 𝑘 , or 𝛥𝑉 = 𝛥 ln 𝐸 − 𝛥ln  (𝑘) 
Thus the random shock, ε, is the sum of a shock to earning power and the shock to the 
discount rate.  Therefore, Value will increase either with a rise in earning power or with a 
decline in risk. 
Now, back to the EMH.  
Possibly the most renowned paper on the efficiency of financial markets is Eugene 
Fama’s 1970 Journal of Finance paper, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work.” In that paper Fama classifies three types of informational 
efficiency in financial markets that can be tested.  
(1) Weak form efficiency: Prices “fully reflect” all historical prices; the implication is that 
investors can’t earn excess risk-adjusted returns with a trading strategy based solely 
on historical data 
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(2) Semi-strong form efficiency: Prices fully reflect all current publicly available data as 
well as all historical data. The implication is that prices adjust rapidly to new public 
information so that investors cannot earn excess risk-adjusted returns trading on new 
public information or historical information. 
(3) Strong form efficiency: Prices fully reflect all private and public information, as well 
as all historical data. The implication is that prices adjust rapidly to all new 
information so that investors cannot earn excess risk-adjusted returns trading on new 
or historical information. 
“The basic market efficiency issue is the extent to which prices reflect historical 
information and adjust quickly to reflect new information (public or private), and whether 
investors can successfully implement trading strategies that earn an excess risk-adjusted 
return.”33  
The implication of EMH is of course that there are no long-term, profitable trading 
strategies, because the hyper vigilant activity of caffeine guzzling analysts are 
continuously and relentlessly trading in response to new information.   
c. Tobin’s Q and Long-Term Reversals 
One of the most fascinating anomalies in securities markets is that of long-term 
reversals—that a series of high returns tends to be followed by low returns and vice 
versa. To gain a bit more insight on this, consider Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q was developed by Nobel Laureate James Tobin in 1968. It is the ratio between 
the market value and replacement value of a physical asset: 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠  𝑄 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
One, the numerator, is the market valuation: the going price in the market 
for exchanging existing assets. The other, the denominator, is the 
replacement or reproduction cost: the price in the market for the newly 
produced commodities. We believe that this ratio has considerable 
macroeconomic significance and usefulness, as the nexus between 
financial markets and markets for goods and services.34 
Below is a graph of Tobin’s Q using Federal Flow of Funds data from 1945 through 
2013. Notice that as of the end of 2013, Q is above 1.0, well above the historical average. 
A recent article by John Cassidy in Fortune expressed concerns about possible 
overvaluation in the stock market as the “Bernanke-Yellen bull market” enters its sixth 
year. Cassidy also suggests Q is a potential metric for evaluating bubble trends.35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 From the lectures of Professor Chris Maxwell (aka cMax) of Boston College.   
34 "Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital." James Tobin and W.C. Brainard, 1977, Economic Progress, 
Private Values and Public Policy 
35 http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/20/investing/keynes-stocks.pr.fortune/ 
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As applied to the common stock of a corporation, we might think of Q as the ratio of the 
price of the stock to the replacement cost of the net assets.  
Tobin’s Q is our key x-variable, and we will describe in further detail why Q is a good 
proxy variable for bubbles below.  
d. A Critical Examination of the Assumptions of the EMH  
“Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off every once in a while, 
or the light won't come in.”         ― Isaac Asimov 
The EMH is built on three fundamental assumptions that do not reflect reality they claim 
to explain: (1) The Rational Expectations Model of Human Behavior (2) The 
Homogeneity of Investors (3) Price Changes follow a Random Walk (Brownian Motion).  
 
(1) Rational Expectations 
 
Is “rational expectations” a rational assumption? The rational expectations model is a 
transmutation of the older rational, utility maximizing model and is not substantially 
different. In essence, the theory is that humans’ expectations equal true statistical 
expected values and that human agents make decisions so as to maximize their utility (i.e. 
their wealth).  
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Therefore, when presented with all appropriate information about a security, individuals 
will make the rational choice that leads to the greatest possible wealth. They will not 
overlook important information, or overpay for a stock they expect to fall. They will 
behave as rational, self-interested individuals. They will make the market work 
efficiently, with their well-reasoned actions driving prices quickly to the “correct” level. 
And their preferences can be expressed in straightforward formulas, (utility functions) 
which, for a given input, always yield the same output.  
 
However, in reality people simply do not think in terms of some theoretical utility, and 
are not always rational and self-interested. The repudiation of this one assumption of 
modern economic/financial theory has in the past twenty-five years created a fertile new 
field of inquiry, called behavioral finance/economics. It studies specifically how human 
beings misinterpret information, how their emotions distort their decisions, and how they 
miscalculate statistical probabilities.  
George Soros also feels quite strongly on this subject:  
I contend that rational expectations theory totally misinterprets how 
financial markets operate. Although rational expectations theory is no 
longer taken seriously outside academic circles, the idea that financial 
markets are self-correcting and tend towards equilibrium remains the 
prevailing paradigm on which the various synthetic instruments and 
valuation models which have come to play such a dominant role in 
financial markets are based. I contend that the prevailing paradigm is false 
and urgently needs to be replaced.36 
(2) Homogeneity of Investors 
The EMH assumes that all investors are alike. They all have the same investment 
objectives and the same time-horizon. Given the same information, they would make the 
same decisions. While their level of capital (i.e. wealth) may vary, none of them can 
influence prices on their own. They are price-takers, not makers.  
In reality, people are not alike. Some buy and hold stocks for thirty years; others trade 
stocks daily. There are fundamentalists and there are “technicians.” There are large 
institutional investors and small, hobbyists/speculators and everyone else in between.  
Once we drop the assumption of homogeneity, new mathematical models must be 
constructed. How much more complicated and volatile is the real market, with almost as 
many different investor classes as individuals? Let’s try to deal with four.  
(3) Asset Price Changes follow a Random Walk   
At the beginning of the 20th century, the French mathematician, Louis Bachelier, 
published his PhD dissertation in which he argued that asset prices follow a Brownian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  George Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crash of 2008 and What It Means 
(New York, 2008), p. 6. 	  
Sherman 21 
	  
motion37, thereby becoming the first person to model asset price movements as a 
stochastic process. This idea that stock prices follow a “random walk” has become a 
foundational building block of modern financial theory and is a fundamental assumption 
of the EMH. What does a random walk look like algebraically? 𝑉! = 𝑉!!! + 𝜀! 
Where 𝑉! is the log of the value of an asset and 𝜀! is a random shock in value with the 
following properties:  𝐸 𝜀! = 0,   𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜀! = 𝜎!,  𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝜀! , 𝜀!!! = 0 
This means that the expected value of the shock, 𝜀! , is 0. It is assumed that these shocks 
follow a normal distribution, which means that price changes follow the proportions of 
the bell curve (i.e. most changes are small while an exceptionally small number are large, 
in predictable and declining frequency).  
Further, all price changes are independent of each other. Intuitively, this means that past, 
historical price changes do not influence prices today. The implication is that nothing can 
be learned by studying past prices, rendering the insights of technicians and “chartists” 
obsolete.  
What might a random walk in asset prices look like graphically? Here are four random 
simulations with the following properties: 𝑉! = 𝑉!!! + 𝛷! + 𝜀! , where 𝛷! is a trend equal to .06 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Brownian motion is a term borrowed from physics for the motion of a molecule in a uniformly warm 
medium. 
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These graphs were all generated using a random value generator in Excel, with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of 0.20. A trend line of 0.06 was added to the random 
values in order to mimic the average returns generated by the S&P500 (approximately 
6%) if all dividends had been retained and reinvested. The important point is that a 
random walk (plus trend) in prices can generate an infinite number of different patterns—
the actual returns of the S&P500 is just one of these outcomes. If a technical analyst were 
shown any of the above graphs, they would have a difficult time distinguishing these 
from real stock price graphs; furthermore, there’s no doubt that they would look at these 
graphs and identify bull and bear markets and possibly even “bubbles”—trends that 
represent nothing more than a series of random, positive or negative shocks that 
coincidentally resemble the real stock market (though with considerably less variance).  
The fundamental problem in valuation is that we don’t know the probability distribution 
of future shocks. All we can observe is the pattern of price changes. If we assume 
markets are efficient, this problem goes away, since prices have always adjusted to the 
point where the expected future return is equal to k, and k depends on a risk-free rate 
(which is observable) the standard deviation of possible shocks (assumed constant) and a 
risk aversion parameter (assumed to change very little over time).  
In reality, life is much more complex. In other words, the random walk might not be as 
random as we all thought. Benoit Mandelbrot, the mathematician famous for discovering 
fractals and developing fractal geometry, was also one of Eugene Fama’s thesis advisors 
in the 1960s. Here’s his take on the situation:  
Alas, the theory is elegant but flaws, as anyone who lived through the 
booms and busts of the 1990s can now see. The old financial orthodoxy 
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was founded on two critical assumptions in Bachelier’s key model: Price 
changes are statistically independent, and they are normally distributed. 
The facts, […] show otherwise. […] 
First, price changes are not independent of each other. Research over the 
past few decades […] shows that many financial price series have a 
‘memory,’ of sorts. Today does, in fact, influence tomorrow. If prices take 
a big leap up or down now, there is a measurably greater likelihood that 
they will move just as violently the next day. It is not a well-behaved, 
predictable pattern of the kind economists prefer—not, say, the periodic 
up-and-down procession from boom to bust with which textbooks trace 
the standard business cycle. Examples of such simple patterns, periodic 
correlations between prices past and present, have long been observed in 
markets—in, say, the seasonal fluctuations of wheat futures prices as the 
harvest matures, or the daily and weekly trends of foreign exchange 
volume as the trading day moves across the globe. […] 
Second, contrary to orthodoxy, price changes are very far from following 
the bell curve. If they did, you should be able to run any market’s price 
records through a computer, analyze the changes, and watch them fall into 
the approximate ‘normality’ assumed by Bachelier’s random walk. They 
should cluster about the mean, or average, of no change. In fact, the bell 
curve fits reality very poorly. From 1916 to 2003, the daily index 
movements of the Dow Jones Industrial Average do not spread out on 
graph paper like a simple bell curve. The far edges flare too high: too 
many big changes. Theory suggests that over that time, there should be 
fifty-eight days when the Dow moved more than 3.4 percent; in fact, there 
were 1,001. Theory predicts six days of index swings beyond 4.5 percent; 
in fact, there were 366. And index swings of more than 7 percent should 
come once every 300,000 years; in fact, the twentieth century saw forty-
eight such days. Truly, a calamitous era that insists on flaunting all 
prediction. Or, perhaps, our assumptions are wrong.38 
III. Restructured Model with New Assumptions 
By relaxing the rational expectations model to include the potential for investors to 
develop irrational expectations, we also create space for the development of a model with 
heterogeneous investor classes. We begin by assuming four classes of active investors: 
(1) Rational Investors, (2) Over reactors, (3) Slow learners, and (4) Crowd Investors. 
Each of these investor classes responds differently to new information, and at any given 
time either Rational Investors or Over Reactors may dominate the market and influence 
price changes disproportionately.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Mandelbrot, Benoit; Hudson, Richard L. (2007-03-22). The Misbehavior of Markets: A Fractal View of 
Financial Turbulence (pp. 11-13). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.   
39 To make these assumptions even more realistic, we might assume Five investor classes, rather than Four. 
We might call this Fifth investor class “Fama Investors,” or investors who believe that markets are 
efficient, and consequently hold an index fund. The implication, of course, is that these investors would not 
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(1) Rational Investors 
RIs accurately interpret shocks and value. They buy stocks when 𝑃! < 𝑉! and sell when 𝑃! > 𝑉!. However, they buy and sell stocks only up to the point that their greater weight 
in stocks (from buying) or a lesser weight in stocks (from selling) is consistent with a 
higher (or lower) Sharpe Ratio.40 When value goes up they anticipate price rising to value 
and thus see a higher Sharpe Ratio at any price below value. Thus they buy and sell, but 
only to the point that their increased weight in stocks is consistent with a higher Sharpe 
ratio at the new price 
(2) Over reactors  
ORs observe a current shock and assume it is a portent of future shocks of like 
magnitude. Their perceived value rises by the current shock plus a weighted average of 
past shocks, which may be modeled by a Koyck average of past shocks. Their perceived 
value will be above 𝑉!  following a series of positive shocks and below 𝑉!  following a 
series of negative shocks. Following a large shock they will be buying so long as 𝑃 <𝑉!  and will be buying from both the rational investors and the SLs.  
(3) Slow Learners 
SLs absorb the impact of news only gradually. In response to a shock of epsilon, their 
perceived value rises by some fraction, λ, of that shock, and by some lesser fraction of 
past shocks. The full shock is or may not be fully absorbed but to the extent it is it 
happens gradually over time. They will sell at any price above their perceived value. 
Thus in response to a large positive shock they are selling to other investors. 
(4) Crowd Investors 
CIs observe how portfolio managers are doing and put their money with the ones that 
have the best records. In effect they invest with a rearview mirror (this is something we 
can observe—the extent to which the managers with the best records have net inflows of 
funds, or at least a larger share of any new money coming into the market). CIs can be 
intuitively thought of as the “herd.”  
Under the EMH, price changes (i.e. “shocks”) are a function of new information, which is 
a random variable.41 Thus, price changes are unpredictable and so we assume a random 
walk. A random walk implies that the probability of a subsequent shock being positive or 
negative is equal.4243 Just by chance we may experience a series of positive shocks, 
possibly resembling what we might identify as a bull market (the inverse is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
engage in speculative trades. Therefore, this investor class does not affect price and is not critical to our 
model. It is useful to point out that this class of investors also exists.   
40	  Sharpe Ratio:	  (𝐸𝑟! − 𝑟!)/σ!, where the numerator represents the reward for bearing risk (the expected 
return from the market minus the risk-free return from a riskless security) and the denominator is the 
market risk 
41 This is self-evident, as one cannot predict the news.  
42 This seems like a reasonable assumption, though we may not be measuring the standard deviation 
accurately.  
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possible). When this happens the four investor classes diverge in their expectations of 
future value and thus in the price at which they are willing to buy and sell. We estimate 
this divergence in perception of value as a weighted average of past shocks, which can be 
modeled by a Koyck average of past shocks.  
 
In response to a series of positive shocks, we contend that the ORs become over weighted 
in stocks, with expected returns that are biased upwards and risk estimates biased 
downwards. Assume that these positive shocks continue for some time.  Prices continue 
to rise and the ORs show superior performance to the other investor classes. The CIs then 
begin to emulate the ORs.44  Following a large enough series of positive shocks the ORs 
(and their groupies) either invest or manage most of the money, and both the RIs and the 
SLs are left in the dust. 
 
As the bubble grows it becomes more and more likely that the next shock will be less 
than expected.  At some point we have disappointment (the shock is less than the average 
of past shocks) and perceived value as seen by ORs comes down.  These investors now 
sell stocks, and price has to fall until the stocks find buyers, presumably from RIs and 
SLs.  If the shock is positive it is bad news to ORs but still good news to RIs and SLs.  If 
the shock is negative (and there is 50-50 chance it will be), then it is bad news to all 
investors and prices have to keep falling until all investors find they have a lower weight 
in stocks with a lower Sharpe ratio than before.   If we have a series of negative shocks, 
then price continues to fall, and the rout is on.  The ORs, with their overweight in stocks, 
underperform the RIs and the SLs.  The CIs move away from the ORs to the SLs (who 
being underweight in stocks are outperforming the market) and to the RIs. 
 
Efficient Markets and Stock Trading 
Assume shareholder’s wealth grows as follows 
€ 
Wt =Wt− ieα+ε t  
Where α is assumed constant and represents the rate at which wealth will grow as a 
function of time preference and acceptance of risk.  We think of this as the going rate of 
return on investment in common stocks. It comes from investment of retained earnings so 
as to earn rate α and from reinvestment of dividends at rate α. Alpha is assumed positive 
because we need to be rewarded for waiting (a risk-free interest rate) and for bearing risk 
(an equity premium).     
The term ε is a random shock with expected value of zero and a constant variance.   
Taking the natural log of 𝑊! , we have 
€ 
lnWt = lnWt−1 +α +ε t  
Now model changes in log wealth due solely to the shocks, or apart from being able to 
reinvest changes in wealth (earnings as properly defined) at rate α.  Thus, let 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This can be conceptualized intuitively as Crowd Investors moving their money to portfolio managers of 
the Over reacting variety.	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€ 
Vt =Vt−1 +ε t ΔVt =Vt −Vt−1 = ε t  
Where V = log of changes in wealth exclusively due to the shock, ε. We do this so as to 
model changes in V under the EMH as a random walk, but we recognize that stock prices 
will rise over time due both to the firm’s retention of earnings and to the shareholder’s 
reinvestment of dividends. In looking at data we would estimate α from the log trend of 
shareholder’s wealth.  
It is understood that following a period when an investor starts at year zero with 𝑉! = 𝑙𝑛𝑊!, that 𝑙𝑛𝑊! will exceed 𝑉! by the amount 𝛼  times t.  
€ 
lnWt = lnW0 + tα +Σε t and Vt = lnW0 +Σε t  
In looking at data we would estimate α from the linear trend in the log of shareholder’s 
wealth. Under the EMH, P is always equal to V and thus the price change is equal to the 
value change. 
€ 
ΔPt = ΔVt = ε t EΔPt = Eε t = 0 Var(ΔPt ) =σ 2 
Thus prices follow a random walk.  We will get bull markets occasionally with a series of 
largely positive shocks. Alternatively, we will get bear markets just by chance with a 
series of negative shocks, but from any point in time the expected value of the future 
price change will be zero.    
Rational Investors Dominate Trading 
We see through a glass darkly and thus in reaction to any shock, or series of shocks, we 
may overestimate V or underestimate V. Assume we start with 𝑃 = 𝑉 but then over time 
experience a series of random shocks. Thus at any future point in time some investors 
overestimate V and some underestimate V.  Let V* be the investor’s perceived or 
estimated value of V and V* - V be thought of as bias upward or bias downward. Assume 
that RIs buy if P<V* and sell if P>V* under the assumption that price will approach their 
perceived estimate of value and they will thus achieve abnormal gains from buying low 
or selling high.  If all investors immediately and correctly perceive the shocks (ε), and 
react immediately to any changes in value, then prices would change immediately and 
fully in response to any changes in value. Why?  Because at any price below value all 
would want to buy but none would want to sell. And at any price above V, all would want 
to sell and none would want to buy.  Thus price changes in lockstep with value and we 
have the efficient market result above.   
But we would have no trading, no buying or selling.  Specialists or dealers would simply 
mark up the bid-ask spread to 𝑃 = 𝑉 and no one would buy or sell.  This obviously is not 
the case.  Thus we need to ask whether the EMH is consistent with buying and selling. 
Define Rational Investors (RI) as a group whose individuals come to different values of 
V* but who as a group have an unbiased estimate of V.  Those with high values of V* buy 
from those with low value but do not affect the price.   If the buying and selling is 
instantaneous, then the price adjusts instantaneously with trading and the EMH still 
holds. 
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Over Reactors (OR) Dominate Trading      
But now suppose that following a series of positive shocks the CIs have moved their 
money to or emulate the ORs and this is the group that now dominates trading. Thus, 
price is equal to (or very close to) their estimate of Value, V*.    𝑃! + 𝑉!∗ = 𝑉! + 𝛽𝑢!,  where 𝑢! = 𝜆𝜀! + 1− 𝜆 𝑢!!! 𝛥𝑢! = 𝑢! − 𝑢!!! = 𝜆𝜀! − 𝜆𝑢!!! 𝛥𝑃! = 𝛥𝑉! + 𝛽𝛥𝑢! =    𝜀! + 𝛽(𝜆𝜀! − 𝜆𝑢!!!) 
This says that value perceived by ORs, V*, is equal to true value, V, plus β times a 
Koyck45 weighted average of present and past shocks. To the ORs, the recent shocks 
become the new reality and they assume that future shocks will have an expected value 
equal to the average of recent past shocks. This may be thought of as the equivalent of a 
perpetually increasing rate of growth in earning power and the multiple β is like a P/E 
ratio. 
At any point in time, starting from a given value of 𝑢!!!, the expected value of the price 
change is: 𝐸(𝛥𝑃|𝑢!!!) = 𝐸 𝜀! + 𝐸(𝛽𝜆𝜀! − 𝛽𝜆𝑢!!!)   
What this says is that if a bubble has been building up from a series of past shocks, then if 
the current shock is at its expected value of zero, then this is disappointing news and the 
price will fall by βλ times the past bubble. And we don’t need a negative value of epsilon 
for the price to fall. All we need is somewhat disappointing news. 
Let’s explore this: 
The variance of the price change will be 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝛥𝑃 𝑢!!! = 1+ 𝛽𝜆 !𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜀! = 1+ 𝛽𝜆 !𝜎! 
with 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (1+ 𝛽𝜆)𝜎 
We can look at the probability of a price increase, or the probability that ∆P>1, as the 
probability that a standardized value of epsilon exceeds a multiple of 𝑢!!! as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 A Koyck distributed lag takes the following form:  𝑣! = 𝜆𝑢! + 𝜆 1 − 𝜆 𝑢!!! + 𝜆 1 − 𝜆 !𝑢!!! +⋯ 
Where λ represents the weight attributed to the current year.  𝑣!!! = 𝜆𝑢!!! + 𝜆 1 − 𝜆 𝑢! + 𝜆 1 − 𝜆 !𝑢!!! +⋯ 
Factoring out a (1-λ) from all but the first term and substitution with the first equation yields: 𝑣!!! = 𝜆𝑢!!! + 1 − 𝜆 𝑣! 
And consequently: 𝑣! = 𝜆𝑢! + 1 − 𝜆 𝑣!!!	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Since ∆P>0 if 𝜀! 1+ 𝛽𝜆 > 𝛽𝜆𝑢!!!      𝑜𝑟      𝜀! > 𝛽𝜆1+ 𝛽𝜆 𝑢!!! 
And this will be the case if 𝜀!𝜎 > 1𝜎 𝛽𝜆1+ 𝛽𝜆 𝑢!!!   
 The term on the left is the standardized value of epsilon  𝑧 = 𝜀! − 𝐸 𝜀!𝜎 = 𝜀!𝜎  
And thus the probability of a price increase is  𝑃 𝑧 > 𝛽𝜆𝜎 1+ 𝛽𝜆 𝑢!!! 
(This is so for any probability distribution of ε.  If we assume that ε is at least 
approximately normally distributed, then this is easy to find.)    
We note that as the bubble 𝑢!!! becomes larger and larger, the probability of a price 
increase becomes smaller and smaller.  Thus bubbles generate their own demise. 
Slow Investors Dominate Trading 
Slow Learners correctly see the current shock, epsilon, but only after a period of time. 
They see a part of it this year, a bit more the next year, and so on. We can model the 
difference between their perceived value V*, and V as a Koyck average of current and 
past shocks:  𝑃! = 𝑉!∗ = 𝑉! − 𝑢! , where, 𝑢! = 𝜆𝜀! + 𝜆 1− 𝜆 𝜀!!! +⋯+= 𝜆𝜀! + 1− 𝜆 𝑢!!! 𝛥𝑢! = 𝑢! − 𝑢!!! = 𝜆𝜀! − 𝜆𝑢!!! 
Thus,   𝛥𝑉!∗ = 𝛥𝑉! − 𝛥𝑢! = 𝜀! − 𝜆𝜀! + 𝜆𝑢!!! = 𝜀! 1− 𝜆 + 𝜆𝑢!!! 
Thus, if SL dominate the market, then P will be very close to V* for the SLs, and the 
price change will be 𝛥𝑃! = 𝜀! 1− 𝜆 + 𝜆𝑢!!! 
And the expected value of the price change will be 𝐸 𝛥𝑃! = 𝜆𝑢!!! 
IV. Empirical Results 
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a. Data 
Data for stock returns and P/E ratios comes from Robert Shiller’s stock market data, used 
in his book Irrational Exuberance (Princeton University Press 2000, Broadway Books 
2001, 2nd ed., 2005). This dataset can be found on Yale’s website at: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
Shiller’s dataset includes monthly data, however, we use annual returns for our key 
dependent variable: Ten Year Cumulative Returns. We use cumulative returns in order to 
explore the lagged or “persistence effect” of past price shocks. Ten years is a crude 
approximation of how long the effect of any past price shock may linger in the memory 
of an investor. Shiller’s stock data on the S&P50 goes back until 1871, giving us 124 
observations.  
Data for Tobin’s Q was calculated using the Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1 
Financial Accounts of the United States and can be found at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf. The Q ratio can be calculated 
from the most recent Federal Reserve Flow of Funds release. The ratio is calculated by 
dividing line 36 of table B.102 by line 33. We calculate Tobin’s Q through 2013. The 
Federal Reserve has data on Tobin’s Q beginning in 1945, leaving us with 69 
observations; significantly fewer than we have with Shiller’s PE.  
Interestingly, Tobin’s Q is calculated using data from nonfinancial firms (i.e. it excludes 
data from banks, insurance companies, etc.). High values of Tobin’s Q are presumably a 
consequence of high growth and/or high profits, which pushes asset prices far above their 
average replacement costs. If markets are efficient, high values of Q should be self-
correcting or self-reversing, so we shouldn’t get very high values of Q for sustained 
periods. Why? Because profits attract entry. When profits are high, new firms enter the 
market and existing firms expand. As investment in plant and equipment grows, a 
corresponding increase in the aggregate capital-labor ratio will result. As basic 
microeconomic theory suggests, diminishing returns to capital set in and the profit rate 
will fall. Therefore, following high values of Q, we should expect lower returns in the 
following years. However, according to the EMH we should not expect lower returns 
following high prices. Because we do in fact find high values of Q to be followed by 
lower returns, we find evidence against rational expectations and for speculative bubbles. 
Independent Variables 
We constructed various cumulative return variables using Shiller’s S&P500 data in order 
to test whether investors’ expectations of future returns are consistent with the market 
efficiency. Specifically we use the following independent variables 
a. Following Year Returns 
b. Following 5 Year Cumulative Returns 
c. Following 10 Year Cumulative Returns 
d. Following 20 Year Cumulative Returns 
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The Following 5 Year Cumulative Returns takes the sum of real stock returns over the 
next five years. In other words, if we have an observation for our dependent variable in 
year 𝑥! ,  then we take the sum of the returns from 𝑥!!! through 𝑥!!!.  For example, we 
have data for Tobin’s Q beginning in 1945. Our Following 5 Year Cumulative Returns 
variable for the year 1945 would be the sum of real returns on the S&P500 from the year 
1946 through 1950. The same was done for the other cumulative return variables.  
Dependent Variables  
a. Tobin’s Q 
b. Shiller’s CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio)46  
 
b. Regression Results 
Two regressions are of particular interest.  
First Regression: 10𝑌𝑟𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝛽  𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄 + 𝜀  
Here we regress Ten Year Cumulative Returns on Tobin’s Q.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 “Price earnings ratio is based on average inflation-adjusted earnings from the previous 10 years, known 
as the Cyclically Adjusted PE Ratio (CAPE Ratio), Shiller PE Ratio, or PE 10” 
(http://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe/).  
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Looking at the scatter plot, we see a clear negative relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
the Following Ten Year Cumulative Returns. Intuitively, this means that we should 
expect to see lower returns in years following high values of Q. Specifically, we find a 𝛽 
estimate for Q of -1.425804 . This is a clear violation of the EMH and adds some 
explanatory power to our bubble hypothesis. With just 69 observations, we have an R-
squared of approximately 0.54.  
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We have a t-statistic for our parameter estimate equal to -8.85. However, because our 
dependent variable is cumulative returns (i.e. each year represents a sum of the next ten 
years’ returns), our observations are not independent. Therefore, our standard errors are 
biased downwards and, as a consequence, out t-statistic is biased upwards.   
In order to correct our standard errors, we run a Newey-West estimator, which is 
commonly used to fix bias that arises from correlation between observations in a control 
variableas well as heteroskedasticity in the error terms. These results are presented 
below:  
 
Our t-stat falls to -5.77, but is still statistically significant at the 5% level. There is no 
change in the parameter estimate.  
Second Regression:  10𝑌𝑟𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡 =   𝛼 +   𝛽  𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑃𝐸 +   𝜀 
Here we regress Ten Year Cumulative Returns on Shiller’s CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted 
PE ratio).  
Sherman 33 
	  
 
We see a clear negative relationship here between Shiller’s PE and Ten Year Cumulative 
Returns. Our regression yields a 𝛽 estimate of -.0041349, and R-squared of 
approximately 0.30, and a t-statistic of -7.29. This test is a simple replication of many 
similar tests initiated by Shiller.  
 
Again, in order to correct for the fact that the observations in our dependent variable are 
not independent, we run a Newey-West regression. These results are attached below. 
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Note, that while the t-statistic for our parameter estimate of Shiller’s PE falls from -7.29 
to -4.93, it is still statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
Additional Regression Results 
Following Year Returns & Q 
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Despite the fact that we don’t have statistically significant results at the 5% level, the 
coefficient estimate on Tobin’s Q is still negative, which still violates the expectations 
implied by the EMH.  
 
Following 5 Year Cumulative Returns & Q 
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In this model with Following 5 Year Cumulative Returns, the negative relationship 
between high values of Tobin’s Q and cumulative subsequent returns is apparent and is 
both statistically and economically significant. 
 
Following 20 Year Cumulative Returns & Q 
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Following Year Returns & Shiller’s P/E 
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Following 5 Year Cumulative Returns & Shiller’s P/E 
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Conclusion & Topics for Further Study  
The EMH is a powerful theory that provides a foundation and starting point for 
understanding securities markets. The purpose of this paper was to provide insight into 
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how market efficiency might be achieved, but more importantly, to provide a framework 
for thinking about how an efficient market can be “derailed” and snowball into a 
speculative bubble. Looking back at history, it seems difficult (indeed, foolish) to deny 
the recurrence of speculative episodes. Given their tendency to occur, it is imperative to 
gain deeper insights into how asset prices are reached. 
To this end, we reach some interesting results by considering Tobin’s Q as a proxy 
measure for overvaluation in securities markets. Over the last 69 years, high values of 
Tobin’s Q have been highly correlated with much lower real returns over the following 
ten years. The EMH simply does not account for this relationship. However, we are still 
far from proving speculative bubbles definitively. Much more work remains to be done! 
Some interesting topics for further study include but are not limited to the following:  
(1) The growing volume of trading securities. Why is everyone incurring all these 
trading costs if they cannot beat the market? Is the thrill of high volume trading 
itself enough to compensate for these losses? This seems irreconcilable with basic 
economic theory, and is not explained by the EMH.   
(2) Why does money move away from managers with poor performance to those with 
superior performance?  Common sense provides an answer, but the EMH does 
not! 
(3) Why does leverage increase during bull markets and fall in bear markets? While 
Minsky’s FIH provides some theoretical explanations for this phenomenon, it is a 
clear violation of the EMH.  
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Other Regression Results  
Model: 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄 + 𝜀 
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Model: 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑟𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄 + 𝜀 
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Model: 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙5𝑌𝑟𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄 + 𝜀 
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Model: 𝐾𝑜𝑦𝑐𝑘𝐴𝑣𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄 + 𝜀 
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Model: 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛!𝑠𝑄 + 𝜀 
 
 
